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THE DEMISE OF FAIR VALUE
Robert W. Harbeson*

Two years ago, in discussing the Natural Gas Pipeline Co'/'J1/}arvy
case,1 the writer ventured the opinion that "while it cannot be stated
with certainty that the decision marks the demise of that hardy perennial-fair value-since the majority opinion did not explicitly repudiate that doctrine," there was language which indicated that such
would nevertheless be the result of the decision.2 This prophecy now
appears to be substantiated by the decision of the S1;1preme Court on
January 3, 1944, in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
Co'/'J1/}any. 8 In the Pipeline Company case Chief Justice Stone stated
significantly that "the Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies
to the service of any single formula or combination of formulas," and
that "if the Commission's order, as applied to the facts before it and
viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at
an end." 4 This statement is not necessarily inconsistent with the Smyth
v. Ames doctrine," however, and it was not clear in the Pipeline Company case whether the rate reduction ordered by the Federal Power
Commission was sustained because the rate base and level of earnings
allowed by the commission were higher than were required by the
Smyth v. Ames test of confiscation, or whether the Court had substituted for that test the economic test of confiscation and had sustained
the reduction because it did not prevent the company from operating
profitably and successfully.
But in the Hope case the necessity of choosing between these two
tests of confiscation was squarely presented and the Court definitely

*

A.B., Western Reserve; A.M., Ph.D., Harvard. Principal Economic Analyst,
Division of Research, Office of Price Administration, on leave of absence from Rutgers
University. Author of numerous articles in economic and legal periodicals.-Ed.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the writer and should not be construed as reflecting the views of any government agency.
1 Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 62
S. Ct. 736 (1942).
2 R. W. Harbeson, "Public Utility Regulation: A New Chapter," 20 HARV. Bus.
REV. 496 at 496 ( l 942).
8 (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 281.
4 Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 at 586
(1942).
'
5 169 U.S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898). See also R. L. Hale, "Does the Ghost
of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?" 55 HARv. L. REV. III6 (1942).
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abandoned the fair value test. The implications of this decision, in the
writer's judgment, may fairly be called epochal. It removes the incubus
of an illogical, uneconomic and administratively unworkable legal doctrine which has rested on state and federal commissions for nearly
forty-six years and which has nullified efforts to bring about effective
regulation. For the first time the possibilities of commission regulation
as an alternative to public ownership may now be fairly tested.
The essential factual background of the case may be stated briefly.
The Hope Natural Gas Company, a subsidiary of the Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey, produces, purchases and markets natural gas
in West Virginia. The great bulk of the gas is sold to five distributing
companies serving eastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania. Three of
these companies, including the important East Ohio Gas Company,
serving Cleveland, Akron, and other large communities, are, like the
Hope Company, subsidiaries of Standard Oil of New Jersey. In July
1938 the cities of Cleveland and Akron filed complaints with the Federal Power Commission alleging that the rates collected by Hope from
the East Ohio Company were excessive and unreasonable. Later in
1938 the Federal Power Commission on its own motion instituted
an investigation of Hope's interstate rates. In March 1939 the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission filed a complaint similar to that
filed by Cleveland and Akron . The city of Cleveland asked that the
challenged rates be declared unlawful and that reasonable rates be
determined from June 30, 1939, to the date of the Federal Power
Commission's order. This was requested as an aid to state regulation
and to afford the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio a proper basis
for disposing of a fund collected under bond by the East Ohio Company since June 30, 1939. The State of West Virginia and its Public
Service Commission intervened in opposition to the proposed reduction
in Hope's interstate rates on grounds which will be discussed below.
The foregoing complaints were consolidated, hearings were held,
and on May 26, 1942, the Federal Power Commission entered its order
and made its findings. 6 Hope was required to decrease its future interstate rates so as to effect an annual reduction of not less than $3,609,857
in operating revenues. Just and reasonable average rates per thousand
cubic feet of gas were established for each of the five customer compa~ies. In response-to the request of the city of Cleveland, the com6 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 44 P.U.R. (N.S.)
(1942}.
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mission also made findings as to the lawfulness of past ,rates, although
conceding that it had no authority to fix past rates or to award reparations. The rates collected by Hope from East Ohio were found to have
been excessive, unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, by $830,892
during 1939, $3,219,551 during 1940, and $2,815,789 on an annual
basis thereafter.
As a basis for its order the commission established an interstate rate
base in the following manner. The actual legitimate cost of the plant
in interstate service was found to be $51,957,416 as of December 31,
1940. This was equal to the company's hook cost with minor adjustments. To this sum was added $ l ,392,021 for future net capital additions, $566,105 for useful unoperated acreage, and $2,125,000 for
working capital. There was deducted $22,328,016 for accrued depreciation, based on the service-life principle and computed by the straightline method. The resulting rate base totaled $33,712,526, upon which
the commission allowed a six and one-half per cent return. The year
1940 was taken as a test period to estimate future revenues and expenses.
By contrast the Hope Company contended for a rate base of
$66,000,000. This represented an estimated reproduction cost of the
property of $97,000,000, less accrued depreciation of about 35 percent
of that amount, estimated by the "percent condition," or inspection
method. The company also presented a so-called "trended original
cost" estimate exceeding $105,000,000, which purported to show "what
the original cost of property would have been if 1938 material and
labor prices had prevailed throughout the whole period of the piecemeal construction of the company's property since 1898." 7 The
company's estimate of actual original cost was $69,735,000, or approximately $ I 7,000,000 in excess of the commission's figure. The latter
amount represented certain items which prior to December 31, 1938,
had been charged to operating expenses, and which the commission
refused to include in the rate base on the ground that "no greater
injustice to consumers could be done than to allow items as operating
expenses and at a later date include them in the rate base, thereby
placin& multiple charges upon the consumers." 8 The items in question
were $12,600,000 expended in well-drilling prior to 1923, during
which period the prevailing accounting practice in the industry, as well
7

8

Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 12.
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as the policy of the West Virginia Commission, called for charging
these sums as expenses rather than as additions to capital; $1,600,000
expended on properties which Hope had acquired from other utilities,
the latter having in turn charged those payments to operating expenses;
and $3,000,000 in various overheads which the company had likewise
treated as operating costs. The commission also refused to add $632,000 as interest during construction on the ground that no interest had
been in fact paid. The company contended for a rate of return of not
less than eight per cent, as compared with the six and one-half per cent
fixed by the commission.
It should also be noted that the co:tnmission found that during the
years when·Hope was not under regulation it had not observed "sound
depreciation and depletion practices" and had accumulated an excessive
depreciation reserve totaling $46,000,000. 9 At the end of 1938 the
reserve was about $ I 8,000,000 in excess of the amount determined by
the commission to be the proper reserve requirement, and in addition
the commission found that the company had in the past transferred
$7,500,000 from the reserve to surplus. Thus the reserve was excessive by $25,500,000. One member of the commission held that the
entii:e reserve, including the excess, should be deducted from the rate
base, but the majority ruled that where incorrect depreciation practices
had prevailed in the past and a business is prought under regulation
for the first time the actual reserve requirement rather than the ex. cessive reserve should be deducted in order to lay "a sound basis for
future regulation and control of rates." 10
Upon appeal the commission's order was set aside by the circ;:uit
court on three grounds.11 First, it held that the commission erred fundamentally in not finding the "present fair value" of the property,
that to arrive at such a figure reproduction cost and trended original
cost should have been considered, and that prudent investment was not
a proper measure of fair value when price levels had charged. Second,
it held that the $17,000,000 representing well-drilling costs and other
items, which had previously been charged to operating expense, should
be included in the rate base. Third, it held, on the authority of the
United Railways 12 case, that both accrued depreciation and the annual
ld. at 18.
Ibid.
11 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, (C.C.A. 4th, 1943) 134
F. (2d) 287.
12 United Railways of Baltimore v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 50 S. Ct. 123 (1930).
9

10
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depreciation allowance should be related to present fair value rat~er
than original cost. It also contended that the commission's findings
with respect to depreciation were invalidated because they were based
on "theoretical" service-life calculations rather than upon inspection
of the current condition of the property. The lower court also held
that the commission had no power to make findings as to past rates in
aid of state regulation, and that, while it could properly make such
findings as a step in the process of £.xing future rates, the findings were
invalidated by the same errors which vitiated the findings on which the
rate order was based. The case was brought before the Supreme Court
through petitions for writs of certiorari.
The decision of the Supreme Court resulted in five opinions. Justice
Douglas wrote the opinion for a majority of five, Justices Black and
Murphy wrote a brief concurring opinion, while Justices Reed, Frankfurter and Jackson each wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Roberts
took no part in the case. The opinion of Justices Black and Murphy
may be quickly dismissed. They stated that they agreed with the
opinion of Justice Douglas and would have added nothing to what had
been said "but for what is patently a wholly gratuitous assertion as to
constitutional law in the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter," namely,
his statement that "Congressional acquiescence to date in the doctrine of
Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Minnesota, supra, ... may fairly be claimed." 13
This was, .of course, the decision which extended the meaning of due
process from a protection against procedural irregularities only to matters of substantive law, and thereby enabled the courts to veto economic
legislation. The two justices stated that it was not their understanding
that Congress had voluntarily acquiesced in that principle and that they
personally never had acquiesced in it and did not now. We turn next
to a consideration of the issues discussed in the other opinions.
The portion of the majority opinion dealing with the ~ll-important
question of the validity of the commission's rate order is brief and the
steps in the argument may be easily traced. The Court coJJ,sidered first
the statutory basis for the commission's action. Section 4 (a) of the
Natural Gas Act 14 provides that all natural gas rates subject to the
commission's jurisdiction shall be just and reasonable. Section 5 (a)
gives the commission power, after hearing, to determine the just and
reasonable rate to be thereafter observed and to fix the rate by order.
281

18 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct.
at 296.
14 52 Stat. L. 833 (1938); 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 717-717w.
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This section also gives the commission power to decrease existing rates
where these are unjust, unlawful or not the lowest reasonable rates.
Finally, section r9 (b) provides that on review of these rate orders
the "finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." With regard to these statutory
provisions, Justice Douglas observed that "Congress, however, has
provided no formula by which. the 'just and reasonable' rate is to be
determined. It has not filled in the details of the general prescription
of § 4( a) and § 5 (a). It has not expressed in a specific rule the fi?{ed
principle of 'just and reasonable'." 15
Next the Court referred briefly to the grounds upon which it had
sustained the constitutionality of the Natural Gas Act in the Pipeline
case, making the following significant comment:
"· .. Rate-making is indeed but one species of price-fixing.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. r r3, r34. The fixing of prices, like
other applications of the police power, may reduce the value of
the property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value
is reduced does not mean that th~ regulation is invalid. Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. r35, r55-r57; Nebbia v. New York, 29r U.S.
502, 523-539, and cases cited. It does, however, indicate that
'fair value' is the end product of the process of rate-making not
the starting point as the Circuit Court of Appeals held. The heart
of the matter is that rates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair
value' when the value of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated." 16
This statement, am01;1g other things, would seem to dispose of the
fallacy of the eminent domain analogy resorted to by the Court in
connection with the development of the fair value doctrine. In several
cases the Court indicated that fair value for rate-making purposes was
analogous to the value sought in condemnation proceedings, while simultaneously taking the inconsistent position that rate reductions which
operated to destroy part of the "value" of the property were nevertheless permissible.17
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct.
281 at 287.
16 Ibid.
17 See Ames v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., (C.C. Neb. 1894) 64 F. 165; West v.
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 55 S. Ct. 894 (1935); Denver
Union Stockyard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 58 S. Ct. 990 (1938). See
also R. L. Hale, "The 'Fair Value' Merry-Go-Round, 1898 to 1938: A Forty-Year
15
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Justice Douglas next stated the principles by which the Court
would be governed in passing upon the validity of the commission's
order. This is the heart of the decision, and because of its very great
importance the pronouncement is quoted at length:
''We held in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra, that the Coµimission was not bound to the use of
any single formula or combination of formulae in determining
rates.... Under the statutory standard of 'just and reasonable'
it is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling. Cf. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 2-89 U.S. 287, 304-305, 3r4; West Ohio Gas Co. v.
Commission (No. r), 294 U.S. 63, 70; West v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 692-693 (dissenting opinion).
It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If
the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and
unreasonble, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The fact
that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then important.... Cf. Railroad Commission v.
Cumberland Tel. & T. Co., 2r2 U.S. 4r4; Lindheimer v. Illinois
Tel. Co., supra, 292 U.S. at pages r64, r69; Railroad Commission
v. Pacific Gas & E. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 4or.
"The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of
'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor
and the consumer interests. . . . From the investor or company
point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only
for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business.
These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. Cf.
Chicago and Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, r43 U.S. 339,
345-46. By that standard the return to the equity owner should
be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises
having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital. See State
of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 29r (Mr. Justice Brandeis concurJourney from Rates-Based-on-Value to Value-Based-on-Rates," 33 ILL. L. REv. 517
(1939). In Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. R.R. Commission of California, 289
U.S. 287, 53 S. Ct. 637 (1933), Chief Justice Hughes stated that when rates are in
dispute "earnings produced by rates do not afford a standard for decision." Id. at 305.
But his accompanying comments leave it uncertain whether he rejected market value
for rate base purposes because evidence of market value was ordinarily lacking in the
case of public utility properties or because he was aware of the circular reasoning involved if it were used. See 2 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION oF PROPERTY u17 (1937).
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ring). The conditions under which more or less might be allowed
are not important here. Nor is it important to this case to determine the various permissible ways in which any rate base on which
the return is computed might be arrived at. For we are of the view
that the end result in this case cannot be condemned under the
Act as unjust and unreasonable from the investor or company
viewpoint." 18
The Court then reviewed the impressive evidence upon the basis
of which it had reached the latter conclusion. During the :first forty
years of its operation the Hope Company had paid over $97,000,000
in cash dividends. Down to 1940 it earned twenty per cent per year
on the average annual amount of its capital stock issued for cash or
other assets, and it earned about twelve per cent per year on an average
invested capital of $23,000,000. During the years 1939, 1940 and
l 941 its dividend rate was ten per cent and in 1942, during about half
of which the lower rates_ were in effect, it paid dividends of seven and
one-half per cent. In addition it had an earned surplus of $13,700,000
at the end of r942, which was equal to almost half the par value of its
outstanding stock, and a depreciation reserve of $46,000,000, wl).ich
was greatly in excess of what the commission had found to be the
actually accrued depreciation. The commission likewise, after extensive
study of the company's :financial history and of the natural gas industry,
pointed out that the company's risk had been minimized by adequate
depreciation and depletion allowances, and that "the company's efficient management, established markets, financial· record, affiliations,
and its prospective business place it in a strong position to attract capital
upon favorable terms when it is required." 10 After reviewing this evidence, Justice Douglas summed up the Court's view of the meaning
of confiscation in the statement that "rates which enable the company
to operate successfully, to maintain its :financial integrity, to attract
capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly
cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only
a meager return on the so-called 'fair value' rate base." 20
'
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., (u.s: 1944) 64 S. Ct.
281 at 287-288.
19 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 44 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1 at
33 (1942).
.
2 °Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct.
281 at 289.
18
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Three observations may be made concerning the foregoing doctrine
of the majority. First, it once more makes controlling the position
taken by the Court a decade ago in the Lindheimer 21 and Dayton
Power and Light 22 cases which were cited by Justice Douglas in support of the statement just quoted. It is true that in several important
decisions subsequent to the Lindheimer and Dayton cases .the Court
reverted to the fair value doctrine,28 and that nowhere in. either the
Pipeline case or the present decision is there any statement to the effect
that Smyth v. Ames is overruled. But in view of the changed personnel
of the Court and the statements contained in the foregoing quotations
from the present case, the prospects for continued adherence to the new
test of confiscation are, in the writer's opinion, greatly improved.
In the second place, the new test is not so precise and objective that
there could be no question as to whether its requirements had been met
by a regulatory body in any given case. In both the Pipeline and Hope
cases, as well as in the earlier Lindheimer case, the companies involved
were so profitable that it would have been almost impossible for the
Court in applying the new test of confiscation to have reached a different conclusion. But in the future we may expect marginal cases to
arise, where it would be debatable whether or not a given level of rates
was resulting in confiscation as measured by the new test. The application of the new test will demand insight and caution on the part of
commissions and restraint on the part of the courts if satisfactory regulation is to be achieved. Judgment concerning the administrative workability of the new test must therefore be reserved until it is given
concreteness through application in marginal cases in the future. But
it would be almost impossible for the new test not to be a vast improvement over the fair value doctrine.
Third, the effect of the Pipeline and Hope cases is to reduce the
exaggerated importance which attached to the rate base during the
ascendancy of the fair value doctrine. The cases in question do not
21
Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658
(1934).
22
Dayton Power and Light Co. v. P.U. Com. of Ohio, 292 U.S. 290, ·54 S. Ct.
647 (1934).
28
West v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935); McCart
v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 58 S. Ct. 324 (1938); Denver Union
Stockyard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470 (1938); Driscoll v. Edison Lt. and
Pr. Co., 307 U.S. 104, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939).
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approve, much less require, prudent investment or any other type of
rate base. The emphasis on the level of earnings permitted is altogether sound and logical, and one consequence may be that the hitherto
neglected factor of the rate of return will achieve, and properly, an
importance comparable to that of the rate base in rate regulation.
Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion agreed that "the theory of
the court below that ties rate-making to the fair-value-reproductioncost formula should be overruled as in conflict with Federal Power
Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co." 24 Presumably, this was also
Justice Frankfurter's view, inasmuch as he expressed agreement with
Jackson's opinion. However, Justice Jackson objected to the reasoning
upon which the majority sustained the commission's rate order, as well
as to other aspects of the majority opinion which will be considered
below. With regard to the rate order, he .complained that "the Court
sustains this order as reasonable, but what makes it so or what could
possibly make it otherwise, I cannot learn.... The Court does lean
somewhat on considerations of capitalization and dividend history and
requirements for dividends on outstanding· stock. But I can give no real
weight to that for it is generally and I think deservedly in discredit as
any guide in rate cases." 25
In the writer's view this is not a fair or accurate statement of the
majority's position. It is true that ordinarily capitalization cannot be
taken as equivalent of inyestment, but the majority say nothing to the
contrary. It is also true that inability to pay dividends does not necessarily indicate that rates are too low but may result from such factors
as inefficient management, excessive capitalization, faulty capital structure, improper financial practices, or declining markets. But the majority clearly permits commissions to consider such factors. In the
portion of Justice Douglas's opinion quoted above it will be noted that,
after stating the general rule that companies are entitled to revenues
which will cover both operating expenses and capital costs, including
interest and dividends, and will enable the companies to attract capital

281

24 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct.
at 300.

25 Id. at 308. Justice Jackson cited in support of this statement 2 BoNBRIGHT,
VALUATION OF PROPER.TY 1 II 2 ( l 93 7). But Bonbright merely says, on the page
referred to, that the par value of a company's securities is not acceptable evidence of
the commercial value of the company or even of the securities themselves.
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on favorable terms, he adds that "the conditions under which more or
less might be allowed are not important here." 26
Justice Jackson also contended that while the regulation of earnings
with reference to a rate base was appropriate in the case of the transmission of natural gas, this procedure was not suitable in the fixing of
compensation for the production of such gas. The reason he advanced
in support of this conclusion was that in the transmission of gas and in
other utility enterprise there is a fairly close relationship between the
amount of service rendered and the magnitude of the investment, while
in the production of natural gas "there is little more relation between
the investment and the results than in a game of poker." 21 He contended, furthermore, that, by whatever method found, a rate base is
of little help in determining the reasonable price of gas because the
"present value" of the intangible rights to capture gas-leaseholds and
freeholds--depended on the value assigned to the gas when captured;
that the Hope Company had not asked that its gas :fields be appraised
on the present value basis; and that in earlier natural gas cases_ the
chief issue between companies and commissions was the "value" to be
assigned to gas leaseholds. Therefore, in Justice Jackson's view, gas
can be directly priced more reasonably and easily than the components
of a rate base can be valued, and commissions should be free "to :fix
the price of gas in the :field as one would :fix the maximum prices of oil
or milk or coal, or any other commodity. Such a price is not calculated
to produce a fair return on the synthetic value of a rate base of any
individual producer, and would not undertake to assure a fair return to
any producer. The emphasis would shift from the producer to the
product, which would be regulated with an eye to average or typical
producing conditions in the :field." 28
Once again, the writer fails to find Justice Jackson's argument convincing. It is true, of course, that in an aleatory business, such as natural
gas production, there are very wide variations in the return secured on
a given investment by different producers, but the difference between
the natural gas business and other businesses in this respect is one of
degree only and not of kind. There would seem to be no reason why
those who assume the risk of securing a meager return, or no return at

:°

Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct.
281 at 288.
27 Id. at 310.
28 Id. at 3 I 1.
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all, on a given-investment in natural gas production could not be satisfactorily compensated by an allowance in the permitted rate of return
appropriate to the degree of risk involved. Justice Jackson correctly
criticizes the appraisal of gas leaseholds and freeholds on the "present
value" basis as illogical and unworkable, but 'this difficulty has been
removed by the majority opinion in the present case, as a result of
which commissions will now be able to put this item into the rate base
at actual cost.
It is also true that the principle of rate'...making applied to Hope's
own gas could not be applied to the gas which it purchased from independent producers, which amounted to two-thirds of the total delivered. But the return allowed Hope was a net return over and above
its outlays for purchased gas, ·and Justice Douglas specifically stated
that the producing states were free to protect the interests of those who
sold to interstate pipelines. Finally, in view of the concentration of
pipeline systems in the hands of a few companies, which also in many
cases control large gas-producing acreage, the bargaining advantage
which th.ese organizations have in dealing with small independent producers, and the need for maint_aining production by marginal operators,
it does not seem to the writer tp.at it would be feasible to fix the maximum price of gas in the same manner "as one would fix the maximum
price of oil or milk or coal, or any other commodity." 29 Nor is it clear
to the writer that the price of gas could be fixed directly more satisfactorily than by reference to an actual cost rate base.
Justice Reed, in his separate dissenting opinion, disagreed with the
majority's doctrine that it made no difference how the commission
reached its conclusions with respect to the appropriate level of earnings
so long as the result was fair and reasonable. He held that when the
phrase "just and reasonable" was used in the Natural Gas Act to describe allowable rates "it had relation to something ascertainable,"
namely, rates which would produce a fair return on the fair value of
the property.so Furthermore, in his view, the decision as to a reasonable
return had not been a source of much difficulty. "And although the
determination of fair value had been troublesome, its essentials had
been worked out in fairness to investor and consumer by the time of the
enactment of this Act. Cf. ~os Angeles G. & .E. Corp. v. Railroad
29

Ibid.

so Id.

at 297.
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Comm., 289 U.S. 287, 304, et seq. The results were well known to
Congress and had that body desired to depart from the traditional
concepts of fair value and earnings, it would have stated its intention
plainly. Helvering v. Griffiths, ·318 U.S. 371." 31 Hence, the commission was required to consider historical cost, prudent investment,
and reproduction cost in arriving at its determination, but was free to
give such weight as it deemed reasonable to these and other factors.
He concluded that the commission had observed this duty and that the
level of earnings which it prescribed did not indicate confiscation or
unreasonableness; not, however, on the grounds stated by the majority,
but because, in his view, the commission had found the fair value of
the property and had allowed a fair,return thereon.
In view of its conclusions as to the adequacy of the rates prescribed
by the commission to protect the financial integrity of the Hope Company the majority found it unnecessary to consider the merits of the
commission's action in refusing to include in the rate base the $ I 7,000,000 of well-drilling outlays and other items which had previously been
charged to operating expense. Both Justice Reed and Justice Jackson
dissented vigorously to this action of the majority on the ground that
exclusion of these items violated the logic of the prudent investment
principle, that, in Justice Jackson's words, it gave "a significance to
formal classification in acco:unt keeping that seems inconsistent with
rational rate regulation," 82 and, by implication, that it constituted inequitable treatment of the company.
In the writer's view, considerations of logic with respect to the rate
base should not be allowed to prevail when these conflict with policies
necessary for equitable treatment of either companies or consumers. In
the present case the commission was clearly correct in holding that the
exclusion of the $17,000,000 was necessary to avoid inequitable double
charging of consumers. At the same time this action worked no hardship on the company, in view of the fact that during the preregulation
period its earnings were in excess of a normal competitive return and
that after paying generous dividends it had accumulated a substantial
surplus in addition to an excessive depreciation reserve. The company
had no claim to earnings in excess of a normal competitive return and,
considered retroactively, the commission's action did not reduce the
company's earnings below that level in the preregulation period. Had
81
32

lbid.
Id. at 307.
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the company's financial history been of the opposite sort through no
fault of its own, equity would have required a different treatment of
the items in question.
With respect to depreciation the· majority achieved a notable advance by accepting actual cost as the proper depreciation base and specifically overruling United Railways v. West. 33 Another point of the
first importance is that the Court expressed no objection to the commission's use of the service-life method of computing accrued depreciation
despite the contention of the company that the "percent-condition," or
inspection, method should be used. Thus the Court has once more indicated that it will accept the service-life method where, as here, it is
developed on the basis of a careful study of the experience of the particular property in question. 34 The way is thus open to commissions to
remedy the inadequate allowances for depreciation which characteristically result from reliance on the inspection method.
Only one important legal obstacle to effective regulatory treatment
of depreciation remains. The decision in Board of J?ublic Utility Commissio'-ners v. New York Telephone Co.,~ which holds that a company's
depreciation reserve is its unrestricted property, fails to recognize the
inseparable connection between the annual depreciation allowance and
accrued depreciation and prevents commissions from correcting or deducting excessive reserves. It is probable that the commission refused
to deduct the Hope Company's entire reserve, including the excess over
the actual accrued depreciation as found by tµe commission, primarily
in deference to the New York Telephone ruling, and perhaps secondarily to offset possible criticism of the disputed elimination of $17,000,000 from the rate base. 36 Equity requires that, with one exception,
280 U.S. 234 (1930).
For statements in support of the service-life method see Knoxville v. Knoxville
Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 148 (1909); Kansas City Southern Ry Co. v. United
States, 231 U.S. 423, 34 S. Ct. 125 (1913), and The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230
U.S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1913). The criticisms of this method in Paci.fie Gas and
Electric Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403, 44_8. Ct. 537 (1924) and McCardle
v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 47 S. Ct. 144 (1926) probably should be
construed as criticisms of the faulty use of this method.
35 271 U.S. 23, '46 S. Ct. 363 (1926). This decision is inconsistent with an
earlier ruling in R.R. Com. of La. v. Cumberland Tel. and Tel. Co., 212 U.S. 414,
29 S. Ct. 357 (1909).
36 For an interesting suggestion to overcome the adverse effects of the New
York Telephone ruling through .the establishment -0.f a statutory recapture clause apply35

54
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the full depreciation reserve, including the excess, be deducted from
the rate base to avoid an overcharge on consumers. The exception is
the case of a company with an excessive reserve which through no fault
of its own had failed to earn a fair return during the period in which
the excessive reserve w~s accumulated. In this case the amount by
which the company failed to earn a fair return may properly be deducted in computing the amount of tlte excess reserve.
The State of West Virginia and its Public Service Commission filed
a brief amicus curiae and participated in the argument before the Supreme Court. They opposed the commission's rate order on the ground
that it would reduce the value of Hope's gas leaseholds and thereby
cost the state many thousands of dollars in taxes; that conservation
policies would be jeopardized by the discouragement of exploratory
development of new fields, hastening the abandonment of low-yield
marginal wells and hampering the recovery of secondary oil; and that
the lowering of the price of gas, by causing consumers to turn to it in
preference to other fuels, would adversely affect the important West
Virginia oil and coal industries. The Court found no statutory evidence
requiring the commission to take account of these considerations, nor
any suggestion "that the exploitation of consumers by private operators
through the maintenance of high rates should be allowed to continue
provided the producing states obtain indirect benefits from it." 37 The
Court pointed out that section I (b) of the Natural Gas Act 38 gave
the commission no authority over "the production or gathering of
natural gas," but that Congress recognized the interests of the states in
the conservation of natural gas by the provisions in section r r instructing the commission to report on, and to recommend legislation in
aid of, interstate compacts dealing with the conservation of gas. It also
pointed out that the commission had considered the necessity of maintaining and encouraging production by including allowances for delay
rentals and exploration and development costs in operating expenses.
An important issue was raised by the contention that the low rates
ing to excess depreciation reserves see P. M. Berkson, "Excess Depreciation Reserve and
Rate Control," 36 CoL, L. REv. 250 (1936). For another approach see 2 BoNBRIGHT,
VALUATION OF PROPERTY I 135 (1937), and New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast,
(D.C.N.Y. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 54.
87
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct.
281 at 292.
38
52 Stat. L. 833 (1938); 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 717-717w.
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charged by Hope to East Ohio on gas for resale to certain industrial
users were con.trary to the public interest in the conservation of gas and
also violative of the· provisions of section 4 (b) prohibiting unjust discrimination as between localities and classes of service. The majority
dismissed the former contention on the ground that there was nothing
in the history or provisions of the Natural Gas Act to suggest that the
standard of "just and reasonable'~ was intended to sanction the maintenance of high rates for the purpose of restricting certain uses of gas.
With regard to the latter contention, the maj9rity merely pointed out
that the com.mission had made no :findings under section 4(b), that its
failure to do so was not challenged in the petition to review and that
therefore the problem of discrimination had no proper place in the
present decision.
Both Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson dissented vigorously
to the majority's treatment of this issue, on the ground that it was based
on too narrow an interpretation of the phrase "public interest" as used
in the Natural Gas A~t. In Justice Frankfurter's words, "The objection
to the Commission's action is not that the rates it granted were too low
but that the range of its vision was too narrow." 89 And Justice Jackson,
after poi1:1ting out that the commission's concept of the public interest
included only the investor interest and the- consumer interest to the
exclusion of all others added these words:
". . . Both producers and industrial consumers have served
their immediate private interests at the expense of the long-range
public interest. The public interest, of course, requires stopping
unjust enrichment of the owner. But it also requires stopping
,unjust impoverishment of future generations. The pµblic interest
in .the use by Hope's half million domestic consumers is quite a
di:fferent one from the public interest in use by a baker's dozen of
industries." 40
Accordingly Justice Jackson was of the opinion that "the great
volume of gas now being put to uneconomic industrial use should either
be saved for its more important future domestic use or the present
domestic user should have the full benefit of its exchange value in
89 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct.
281 at 299.
.
401d. at 313.
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reducing his present rates." 41 Furthermore, he held that in order to
make this policy effective it would only be necessary to modify Hope's
. contract with East Ohio to provide that domestic users receive the full
benefit of the rate reduction in the present order and any further reductions made possible by increasing industrial rates, and that· the price of
gas delivered under the contract for industrial purposes shall be fixed
at such a figure as the commission might find to be in the public interest
-defined presumably to include considerations of conservation.
It may be debatable whether or not Justices Frankfurter and Jackson were correct in their interpret4tion of the commission's duty to take
account of these considerations under the Natural Gas Act in its present
form. The writer feels, however, that it would be desirable to amend
the act to provide that the commission, with due regard, for vested
interests and the financial soundness of the pipeline companies, should
establish rates which would reserve as much of the available gas as
practicable for domestic users .and those industrial uses in which gas has
a special technical advantage over other fuels.
Last of all, the majority held that the findings of the commission
as to the lawfulness of past rates, which were made in aid of state regulation, were not reviewable under the provisions for review in section
I 9 (b) of the statute, and that the doctrine of Rochester Telephone
Corp. v. United States 42 was applicable, namely, that an order is not
reviewable which "does not of itself adversely affect complainant but
only affects his rights adversely on the qmtingency pf future administrative action." 43
In conclusion it may be appropriate to indicate, in the light of the
removal of the obstacles presented by the fair value doctrine, some
directions in which effort should be directed to improve the principles
and procedure of public utility regulation. First, there must be more
general recognition of the fact that it is ordinarily neither possible nor .
desirable for a company to earn a normal c9mpetitive return in each
and every year, and that the companies are entitled to an opportunity
to earn the so-called fair return only in the long run and ori the average
of good and bad years taken together. Second, there must be recog41

Id. at 314.

42

307 U.S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754 (1939).
Id. at 130.

48
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nition of the importance of short-run changes in the level and structure
of rates which would be designed to mitigate the maladjustments incident to cyclical fluctuations in business and to encourage the fullest
use of utility services. Finally, closer and more systematic attention
should be given to the propriety of the sums claimed by the utilities as
operating expenses and to the development of effective incentives to
management to increase the efficiency of utility operations. The decision
in the Hope case presents a challenge to regulatory bodies to make full
use of their new opportunities for progress in these directions.

